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Beauty and Appearance in Corporate Director Elections 
1. Introduction 
The fact that an election candidate’s facial appearance affects and even accurately predicts 
a political election’s outcome has been shown by several studies (e.g. Todorov, Mandisodza, 
Goren, and Hall, 2005). Most research examines the effect of beauty on electoral success 
(Berggren et al., 2010; Benjamin and Shapiro, 2009; Leigh and Susilo, 2009; Olivola and 
Todorov, 2010; Rosar, Klein, and Becker, 2008). Berggren et al. (2010), for example, show 
that an increase in their measure of beauty by one standard deviation augments the votes in 
favor of a candidate by 20 percentage points. This finding holds for both male and female 
candidates and is unaffected by their education and occupation. While one would expect a 
rational voter to form an opinion about the candidate’s suitability based on his or her political 
ideas, past track record, competence, or at least the program of the political party, the fact that 
beauty plays such an important role may surprise. The psychology literature on decision-
making dedicates much attention to the dual-process decision framework, according to which 
individuals make instantaneous, unreflective, and effortless assessments of a candidate’s 
appearance (the System 1 brain), and subsequently correct possible biases by consciously 
engaging in slow and effortful System 2 brain processes (Todorov et al., 2005). The strength 
of immediate decisions (System 1) can affect the processing of subsequent information, which 
may not (sufficiently) take place for a segment of the voters who thus mostly rely on first 
impressions (e.g. Bar et al., 2006; Willis and Todorov, 2006, Hall et al., 2009). Still, some, such 
as White, Kenrick, and Neuberg (2013), try to rationalize the voters’ choice by stating that they 
rely on attractiveness as a cue to avoid electing leaders suffering from diseases. Others suggest 
that voters may simply favor good-looking candidates, as they enjoy watching them (Berggren, 
Jordahl, and Poutvara, 2010). It could also be possible that facial attraction is related to a set of 
traits, which are desirable for a job or position, but Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2017) reject this 
connection between facial attraction and superior performance.  
In this paper, we turn to elections at the corporate level, namely the elections and the re-
elections of executive and non-executive directors, which are mandatory in the UK1, and 
wonder whether facial beauty is an advantage in director (re-)elections? Our basic hypothesis 
                                                     
1 The UK Corporate Governance Code from 2016 (CGC, 2016: B.7.1., p. 15) states that: “All directors 
of FTSE 350 companies should be subject to annual election by shareholders. All other directors should 
be subject to election by shareholders at the first annual general meeting after their appointment, and to 
re-election thereafter at intervals of no more than three years. (…) The names of directors submitted for 
election or re-election should be accompanied by sufficient biographical details and any other relevant 
information to enable shareholders to take an informed decision on their election.“ 
  
 3 
is that facial beauty would not play a role because shareholders who vote on director2 (re-
)appointments can rely on information about the director’s education and experience as well as 
about the firm’s past performance, all of which is presented in the annual report and available 
prior to the (re-)election votes. However, even in a corporate context, there is some evidence 
that beauty plays a role: beauty is reflected in a corresponding premium in a top manager’s 
remuneration (Hammermesh and Biddle, 1994; Graham et al., 2017), and the share price returns 
to news announcements made by CEOs with high facial attractiveness are higher (Halford and 
Hsu, 2014). 
Even if facial attractiveness were to affect corporate elections, the question arises whether 
only beauty matters or also the appearance of competence? In the context of political elections, 
not only facial beauty but also perceived competence based on appearance augments electoral 
success (Hall et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2005; Sussman et al., 2013). Perceived (appearance-
based) competence positively affects the CEO selection and the size of his compensation 
contract (Graham et al., 2017). In addition to beauty and perceived competence, some studies 
test for other perceived traits (based on looks), such as leadership, trustworthiness, and 
intelligence, but this does not yield conclusive results (Berggren et al., 2010; Todorov et al., 
2005).  
We then ask the question whether facial appearance matters equally for male and female 
corporate directors? Some studies suggest that appearance may be the strongest predictor of 
political electoral success for female candidates, and that voters associate higher female 
attractiveness with more positive traits (Poutvaara, Jordahl, and Berggren, 2009; Nisbett and 
Wilson, 1977). Kaplan (1978) states that the ‘attractiveness halo effect’ only exists for female 
candidates.  
We also examine whether facial appearance matters more for executive than for non-
executive directors, because the former bear direct responsibility for the corporate results 
whereas the latter are mainly performing a governance and monitoring role.  
Given that we can study both the first elections and re-elections of corporate directors, we 
ask whether facial appearance matters more in appointment elections than in re-elections? The 
reason for this conjecture is that, in the case of re-elections, shareholders have more information 
at their disposal: they should by then be aware of the corporate performance for which they can 
hold the directors partially responsible (or accountable), and have had the opportunity to learn 
more about the directors’ education, experience, and track record because this information has 
by then appeared at least twice in annual reports. Furthermore, shareholders have been able to 
                                                     
2 Throughout the paper, we use the UK terminology regarding board membership: a director is a 
member of the board and can be an executive or non-executive director. In the US, the term ‘director’ 
is usually reserved for a non-executive director.  
  
 4 
study the facial appearance more than once such that there is no ‘first impression’ effect 
anymore. Alternatively, facial appearance may be less important at first elections when 
shareholders may just follow the nomination committee’s proposed candidate without relying 
on facial impressions, and thus give the candidate the benefit of doubt.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study on the effects of facial appearance on voting dissent 
in corporate director elections. Notably, the situation is different from political voting 
processes, in that shareholders usually vote only on a single candidate for a director position. 
Still, as we observe the total number of favorable, against, and abstained votes for each 
individual director for each firm-year, we consider the abstained and against votes a 
disciplining device or a critical indicator (Grundfest, 2003). We perform an experiment 
whereby we have the director candidates’ photos, which we hand-collected from the annual 
reports, rated on five dimensions (beauty, competence, trustworthiness, likability, and 
intelligence) on the basis of which we subsequently built our global appearance measure.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: shareholders rely on inferences from 
facial appearance at corporate director elections as voting dissent decreases in a candidate’s 
appearance (while controlling for corporate performance, other firm characteristics, and 
director education). When we dissect facial appearance into its five dimensions, we find that 
beauty does not affect voting dissent, but that directors who look more competent, trustworthy, 
likable, and intelligent receive more votes in their favor. The correlation between facial 
appearance and voting dissent holds for executive directors but not for non-executive directors. 
Shareholders rely more on facial appearance in the setting of director re-elections than of first 
appointment elections, which may reflect that they are more familiar with the looks of the 
directors who are up for re-election. Inferences from facial appearance matter more for 
investors holding small equity stakes, presumably as they have less time to conduct research 
on the past performance and background of directors. While female candidates experience in 
general less voting dissent than their male counterparts, their facial appearance (including 
beauty) does not affect their elections results. 
2. Institutional Facts and Data 
The setting for our study is the UK, which is characterized by a high level of corporate 
transparency regulation, a one-tier board model, mostly flat ownership structures, the one-
share-one-vote principle, and few cases of ownership pyramids or cascades (La Porta et al., 
1999; ISS, 2007; Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2009). The UK Corporate Governance Code (CGC, 
2016) demands a formal and transparent procedure for director appointments and a progressive 
'refreshing' of the board (CGC, 2016: B.2). The search procedure for director candidates as well 
as their appointment should be conducted with the help of objective criteria and due regards to 
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the benefits of diversity (CGC, 2016: B.2.4). The responsibility therefore typically resides with 
the nomination committee, which should be made up of a majority of independent non-
executive members (CGC, 2016: B.2.1). Central to the CGC is that the board should undertake 
a formal evaluation of its own performance on a yearly basis (CGC, 2016: B.6). Subject to 
directors’ satisfactory performance and commitment, the chairman can propose directors for 
appointment and re-election (CGC, 2016: B.7.1 & B.7.2). The appointment of new directors of 
listed companies is subject to a shareholder vote at the first annual meeting after their proposed 
appointment. Incumbent directors of a FTSE 350 firm are up for reelection on a yearly basis at 
the annual general meeting. All other directors of listed firms are up for reelection at regular 
intervals of no more than three years. Specific rules apply to nonexecutives who have served 
for more than six years on the board: a particular rigorous review should then be undertaken of 
their position and functioning. Non-executives who served more than nine years on the board 
are subject to annual re-elections. According to a recent discussion paper on board 
(re)appointments, shareholders expressed a need for more information on individual directors 
as well as their individual corporate contributions for the purpose of re-elections (UK Board 
Succession Planning, 2015). While the UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) follows a 
'comply or explain' approach that rendered boards with a substantial proportion of independent 
directors more attentive to shareholders interests (Guo and Masulis, 2012), the requirements of 
the FCA Listing Rule 9.8.6R(5) are binding and oblige the board to provide meticulous details 
on the procedures for board appointment. Furthermore, the Companies Act 2006 suggests that 
public companies should let shareholders individually vote on directors (Companies Act 2006: 
Ch. 1, 160(1)) and that shareholders should be given the power "to remove all or any of the 
directors at any time for any reason by ordinary majority vote" (Davies, 2015: 12). In sum, the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, the FCA Listing Rules, and the Companies Act make clear 
prescriptions on the process of director (re)appointments in terms of transparency, frequency, 
and shareholders involvement in the process.  
We collect director election data (favorable, against, and abstained votes) from the 
Manifest database where we find information on 621 elections and re-elections for 144 male 
directors and 38 female directors over the period of 12 years (1996-2007). On average, we 
observe two votes per director over the entire sample period (Table 1). Frequently though, 
individuals serve simultaneously (and sequentially) on multiple boards and are therefore 
subject to a higher number of director elections: we observe a maximum of nine votes per 
individual in our sample. We distinguish also between first- and re-elections: First elections 
refer to all events where shareholders vote for the first time on a director’s candidacy (26% of 
the sample) and which typically take place during the first annual meeting after the proposal to 
appoint the candidate to the board. We label all subsequent elections of a director as re-
elections. Following Gregory-Smith and Main (2014), we take as dependent variable the voting 
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dissent, which is based on the sum of the non-positive votes (i.e. abstentions and against votes, 
both in percentages), divided by the favorable votes:  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
(% 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠)
(1 − % 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠)
 
We give an example to illustrate the calculation of our dissent measure: 91.1% of the 
shareholders approve the re-election of R M Heard as a director in BPB plc at the annual general 
meeting on March 31, 1998. At the same time, 4.7% of the shareholder vote against this 
resolution and 4.3% opt for abstain. Hence, the calculation of our dissent measures gives: (4.7% 
+ 4.3%) / 91.1% = 0.098. Clearly, the higher the percentage of non-positive votes, the higher 
our dissent statistic becomes. In other words, the size of the dissent statistic reflects the level 
of dissent in a particular election. With a median dissent statistic of roughly 0.005, most 
elections face a relatively low level of dissent consisting of relatively few against and abstained 
votes.3,4 When comparing the median with the reported mean of 0.026, it becomes clear that 
the latter statistic is affected by a number of cases with a relatively high dissent: as a point in 
case, we observe a maximum dissent statistic of 0.422 for the re-election of Mr. S. Murfin as 
finance director and company secretary in Wyevale Garden Centres plc on April 30, 2003 with 
the non-positive votes amounting to roughly 29.7%. Casting dissenting votes is likely to have 
a negative impact on the share price, as it could highlight a problem situated at the board level 
of the firm (Gregory-Smith and Main, 2014).  
For all directors, we hand-collected their photographs from the annual reports at the time 
of the director election. As the director photographs are frequently re-used in the subsequent 
annual reports, we cannot track the impact of the evolution of facial appearance over time. We 
calculated an appearance score based on the ratings of directors’ looks, whereby the raters were 
contacted by means of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online human intelligence platform, 
where we performed the experiment. Following Berggren et al. (2010), we asked the 
Mechanical Turk raters to evaluate the appearance of directors on a scale from 1 to 5 for each 
of five categories: beauty, competence, trustworthiness, likability, and intelligence, whereby 
five is the highest perceived attractiveness by category (see Appendix A). We provided the 
raters with these definitions: beauty stands for physical appearance or attractiveness of the 
person; competence for the ability to do something successfully or efficiently; trustworthiness 
for the ability to be relied on as honest or truthful; likability for being pleasant, friendly, and 
easy to like; and intelligence for the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills. 
For each dimension of a director candidate’s appearance, we collected the responses from 
at least five different raters. The raters were unaware of the purpose of this study, and did not 
                                                     
3 Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009: 2389) suggest that "even poorly performing directors typically 
receive over 90% of votes cast".  
4 Excluding the votes above 98% of approval shows an average against vote percentage of 2.0%. 
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know that they were evaluating the appearance of executive and non-executive directors. To 
avoid potential biases induced by the possibility that raters could recognize the directors (as 
some were e.g. CEOs of large firms who appear in the media), we excluded the director 
elections that took place over the past decade – our elections therefore cover the period 1996-
2007.5  We have chosen raters that share the English-speaking cultural background of the 
directors; the raters stemmed from either the UK or the US. As a robustness test, in order to 
minimize the probability that the raters could recognize the directors, we restricted the raters to 
those with a US nationality. As experienced raters of Mechanical Turk can earn a ‘Master’ 
qualification, which reflects high reliability and accuracy in specific tasks across a variety of 
tasks, we only retained the raters with such a qualification. To make sure that raters have 
carefully read the instructions and questions before submitting their rating, we excluded the 
responses for which all five evaluations together (per rated person) were submitted within two 
seconds (i.e. 0.8% of the sample). 6  The degree of rater agreement differs somewhat by 
category: while the consensus concerning likability is somewhat lower, we observe a stronger 
homogeneity in the ratings on intelligence and competence (see Table 1).  
To compute the overall appearance score, we (i) scale each response by the rater’s average 
response in the respective dimension (beauty, competence, trustworthiness, likability, 
intelligence) in order to correct for a potential bias introduced by an individual rater’s attitude 
towards the dimension (in other words, we correct for the possibility that a rater persistently 
gives high or low scores on a specific appearance dimension), (ii) calculate the mean of the 
scaled responses on each dimension for each director, and (iii) also calculate the sum of the 
scores over all five dimensions for each director and then divide this sum by the maximum 
score of 25 in order to obtain the overall appearance score ranging from 0 to 1. This overall 
appearance score (Mean, Scaled) ranges from 0.41 to 0.74, with an average and median of 0.60 
(Table 1). This table also includes the unscaled appearance scores (Mean, Raw is calculated by 
means of the average ratings that are not adjusted for individual rater’s score levels) and the 
scores based on the median appearance score whereby the median is taken across raters by 
director and dimension and are presented as raw scores and scaled scores (adjusted for rating 
biases at the rater level). We apply the default set-up (Mean, Scaled) to the dimension scores 
that are also presented in Table 1. 
As for the financial data, we use market capitalization (winsorized and log transformed in 
the regressions) and Tobin’s Q (market capitalization divided by shareholders’ equity, 
                                                     
5 The raters were also explicitly asked whether they recognized him or her (by giving the candidate’s 
name) when rating each subject. This was the case for two raters whose ratings were then excluded, 
thereby following the example of Benjamin and Shapiro (2009). 
6 As a robustness test, we excluded the responses submitted in less than five seconds, but this did not 
change the results.  
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winsorized in the regressions) from Manifest, while all other data are from Datastream. The 
performance measure ΔQ captures the change in Tobin’s Q relative to the average of the 
previous three years. 
The information on director gender, tenure (in years), and compensation come from Capital 
IQ and Manifest. To obtain our adjusted total compensation measure by director, we subtracted 
the average compensation of all directors for a given year and by industry from the director’s 
compensation in a specific year, and did so for executive and non-executive directors 
separately. We also calculated the ratio of non-executive directors on the board as a measure 
of the degree of board monitoring. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix B. We also 
present a correlation matrix of the main variables in Appendix C. We do not detect a strong 
correlation between our explanatory variables (see Appendix C). 
=================================== 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
=================================== 
Subsequently, we put our hypotheses to a test, using the following regression model, which 
we estimate by means of (i) an OLS model with robust standard errors and with clustered 
standard errors at the company and the individual levels as robustness test, and (ii) a panel-data 
random-effects model:  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖  + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 × 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5
×  𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 (%)𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸𝑠 +  𝛽8 𝑥 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸𝑠 +  ℇ𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
3. Results 
3.1 Facial Appearance 
We present the relation between dissent and director appearance (and other control 
variables) in Table 2. Columns (1) – (4) exhibit the significantly negative effect of appearance 
on voting dissent for each of the four measures of overall facial appearance, described above. 
The parameter estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the appearance score 
is associated with a decrease in voting dissent of about 0.007, which is equivalent to a decrease 
in the likelihood of a negative vote of 26% on average.7  Across all measures, the results are 
statistically significant at the 1% (or 5%) level of confidence and support the idea that directors 
with better appearance are favored in corporate director elections. The models of Table 2 also 
                                                     
7  At the average level of voting dissent (0.026), there are 2.53% negative votes. A one standard 
deviation increase in overall appearance reduces dissent by 0.007, which is equivalent to a decrease in 
the percentage of negative votes from 2.53% to 1.86%. 
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show that an improvement in performance relative to the previous three years (i.e., higher ΔQ) 
is significantly negatively associated with voting dissent (at the 5%-level). Neither (board) 
tenure, which proxies for a first election (of a new director) or re-election, nor director 
compensation or the proportion of non-executives on the board are significantly related to the 
voting outcomes. We find that there is more dissent in larger companies, possibly due to the 
fact that the shareholder base is more dissipated. 8  The results from our estimation with 
clustering standard errors at the individual level are similar to the results with clustering at the 
company level and to those obtained from random-effects panel data regressions (not shown). 
In sum, more ‘attractive’ facial appearance reduces dissent in corporate director elections. 
=================================== 
Insert Table 2 about Here 
=================================== 
 
3.2 Beauty and Perceived Competence 
We turn to the question which facial traits do shareholders (unconsciously) care about when 
voting in corporate director elections? We replace the appearance scores for the dimensions of 
facial appearance and show the corresponding results in Table 3.9 Most appearance dimensions, 
namely competence, trustworthiness, likability, and intelligence do affect voting: dissent is 
lower when the scores on these dimensions are higher. The exception is beauty, which is not 
statistically significant, suggesting that shareholders do not value the pure physical 
attractiveness of a director’s appearance. We also document that higher adjusted total 
compensation is positively associated with dissent, which implies that excessive pay is frowned 
upon by shareholders. We summarize our findings from this table as follows: shareholders pay 
attention to those dimensions of appearance that they believe proxy for – whether or not rightly 
so – the traits required to perform the task of a director: competence, trustworthiness, and 
intelligence. In this sense, facial beauty appears not to be an advantage in corporate director 
elections, and perceived competence clearly dominates beauty with respect to its impact on 
shareholder voting behavior.  
=================================== 
Insert Table 3 about Here 
=================================== 
 
                                                     
8 We analyze the relationship between ownership structure and voting dissent in a reduced sample of 
companies for which ownership information is available. Block holdings of financial institutions, 
corporations and individuals are negatively, albeit not significantly, related with dissent (not shown). 
9 We do not include the five dimensions in one model in order to avoid possible multicollinearity: the 
maximum correlation between any two dimensions is 0.585 (see Appendix B).  
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3.3 Gender, Director Type, (Re-)Elections, and Institutional Ownership 
We examine the role of gender on voting dissent by including an indicator variable equal 
to one if the director candidate is female, as well as the interaction term between gender and 
appearance. The appearance of male directors is significantly negatively related to voting 
dissent (Column (1) of Table 4) with the size of the corresponding coefficient (-0.138) being in 
line with the one reported for all directors in column (1) of Table 2. The reported coefficient of 
0.145 for the appearance effect of female directors is about as large, but is positively and 
significantly (at the 10% level) related to dissent. As the two parameter estimates largely cancel 
out, there is no effect of female directors’ appearance on corporate director elections’ voting 
dissent. This adds a twist to the idea that attractive looks result in more favorable real-world 
outcomes for individuals in most settings (Hammermersh, 2006).  
Model (1) also shows that female directors generally face lower voting dissent as the 
estimate of the female dummy coefficient of -0.095 is negative, and (weakly) statistically 
significant. The reason why female directors experience less voting dissent may be that gender 
diversity at the board level is an important corporate goal and top female directors are still in 
short supply (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ferreira, 2010; CGC, 2016: B.2.4). A more detailed 
analysis by means of the five dimensions of appearance, such as beauty or competence, shows 
that these dimensions do not correlate with voting dissent for female directors (not tabulated). 
In sum, appearance matters for male directors in a context of corporate elections, but not for 
female directors. 
Voting on executive director (re-)elections may attract more attention from shareholders 
because executives bear more responsibility for the firm’s performance. Consequently, we split 
our sample and run our baseline regression on executive directors and non-executive directors 
separately. The corresponding results (Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4) indicate that the impact 
of appearance on dissent is mainly driven by the executive directors. Again, the results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in our baseline regression (Table 2). 
This result suggests that facial appearance matters more for executive directors than for non-
executive directors, presumably as the former have a higher responsibility with respect to 
corporate results.  
In Columns (4) and (5), we partition the sample into first elections and re-elections. 
Contrary to our conjecture, appearance does not affect first elections, although shareholders 
have no or little information yet about these directors’ performance especially when they are 
recruited from outside the firm, and shareholders then seem more prone to follow the 
nomination committee’s recommendations and approve the candidate. In re-elections, 
appearance does have an impact on voting dissent. As time passes, shareholders are able to 
relate directors to past firm performance, but when they are more familiar with the directors, 
these directors' appearance then starts to matter more. A reason may be that shareholders are 
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now ready to deviate from the nomination committee’s recommendation, but still largely fail 
to process additional information to correct biases stemming from their first impressions 
(Todorov et al., 2005; Todorov and Uleman, 2003). In Column (6), we restrict our sample to 
only one re-election per director and company in order to focus on the cross-sectional 
dimension of the data and to rule out any concern about autocorrelation. The results for this 
restricted sample confirm that director appearance significantly reduces voting dissent.  
Lastly, we investigate whether our results depend on shareholder type. It may be that 
institutional shareholders are more likely to conduct research, prior to the vote, on the quality 
of the candidates. Therefore, director appearance may be less likely to affect their voting 
decisions. Retail investors, in contrast, who primarily own only small share stakes may not 
analyze candidates’ profiles and past performance in detail, which may entail that they use the 
appearance heuristic to proxy for the real competence and trustworthiness of the director. 
Therefore, we retest our baseline regression for the subsamples of firms with low institutional 
ownership (bottom half) and those with high institutional ownership (top half) in columns (7) 
and (8) of Table 4. We find that appearance is important for the firms in both subsamples, but 
the effect is stronger (and statistically significant) for companies with low institutional 
ownership, which suggests that inferences from facial appearance matter more for shareholders 
who are less likely to conduct research on director quality. 
=================================== 
Insert Table 4 about Here 
=================================== 
3.4 Robustness Tests 
We perform the following robustness tests: First, we consider the candidates’ level of 
education as an additional explanatory variable for voting outcome. Column (1) in Table 5 
presents the corresponding results. The categorical variable education is equal to 1 for a director 
with a professional qualification or a university-level bachelor degree, 2 in case of a master 
degree, and 3 if the candidate has been awarded a doctoral degree. A candidate without a formal 
university degree is assigned a value of 0. As we do not find a significant relation between a 
candidate’s education and voting dissent, while overall appearance and the individual 
dimensions perceived competence and intelligence remain significant, we conclude that neither 
overall appearance, nor perceived competence or intelligence go hand in hand with the level of 
education.  
Second, we investigate whether the relation between dissent, on the one hand, and 
appearance and its dimensions on the other, is non-linear by including higher order appearance 
variables. We do not find evidence that the relation is non-linear (not tabulated).  
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Third, we re-estimate our baseline model using alternative dissent measures, such as (non-
positive votes)/(1–negative votes) (see Column (2)) and a measure where all abstained votes 
are excluded. Our results do not change.  
Fourth, we re-estimate our base line model with different performance measures (e.g. 
including the current performance (Q), and the change in Q relative from the past one-year 
average performance) and with a firm’s accounting performance measure (ROA), but this has 
no material impact on our results (not tabulated).  
Fifth, we measure the models clustering standard errors at the individual and company level 
and perform a random effects model. The corresponding results (Column (3) and (4)) confirm 
our baseline results. The results are also robust to including company and industry fixed effects, 
as well as time fixed effects.  
=================================== 
Insert Table 5 about Here 
=================================== 
 
4. Conclusion 
By means of annual report photographs of corporate directors who are candidates for a board 
position or are up for re-election, we gather ratings of various dimensions of facial appearance 
(beauty, perceived competence, trustworthiness, likability, and intelligence) on the basis of 
which we construct an overall appearance measure. In line with studies on political elections 
(Berggren et al., 2010; Todorov et al., 2005), our results suggest that shareholders use 
inferences from facial appearance in corporate director elections. We find that directors with 
better (higher rated) appearance fare better in corporate director elections, as an increase in the 
measure of appearance by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in voting dissent, 
equivalent to a decrease in the likelihood of negative votes of 26% on average. By examining 
the various dimensions of appearance, we reveal that facial beauty – in contrast to the case of 
political elections – does not play a role in director (re-)elections, but that perceived 
competence, trustworthiness, likability, and intelligence reduce voting dissent. This implies that 
shareholders regard director traits, such as competence, trustworthiness, and intelligence, which 
are all needed in the position of director, as important and that they use imperfect heuristics, 
namely whether these traits are perceived in the physical appearance of the directors, as proxies 
for the (real) traits. When we examine the gender-related effects of appearance on voting 
dissent, we find that appearance does not affect female director elections. Female candidates 
generally face less voting dissent than their male counterparts, presumably because companies 
and shareholders recognize the benefits of gender diversity at the board level and because top 
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female directors are still in short supply (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ferreira, 2010; CGC, 2016: 
B.2.4). We also document that shareholders owning small equity stakes are more likely to rely 
on inferences from facial appearance than those holding large equity blocks, presumably 
because major blockholders perform more research on the directors’ performance and 
background than small retail investors.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the main variables. The corresponding list of variable 
definitions, including the calculation of the variables is presented in Appendix B. The data are from 
Boardex, Capital IQ, Datastream, Manifest, and from our own experiment. 
 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Median Max 
No. elections/individual and company 307 2.022 1.211 1 2 9 
Approval 447 0.662 0.457 0 0.979 1 
Against 447 0.011 0.024 0 0.003 0.173 
Abstain 447 0.011 0.029 0 0.001 0.236 
Dissent  447 0.026 0.059 0 0.005 0.422 
Appearance - beauty 603 2.994 0.451 1.682 2.994 4.275 
Appearance - competence 603 3.021 0.347 1.829 3.009 3.657 
Appearance - trustworthiness 603 3.004 0.387 1.959 2.958 3.941 
Appearance - likability 603 2.965 0.574 1.342 3.003 4.229 
Appearance - intelligence 603 3.014 0.320 2.058 3.038 3.775 
Appearance (Mean, Scaled) 603 0.600 0.054 0.406 0.604 0.741 
Appearance (Mean, Raw) 603 0.673 0.061 0.464 0.672 0.824 
Appearance (Median, Scaled) 603 0.599 0.057 0.403 0.601 0.750 
Appearance (Median, Raw) 603 0.671 0.065 0.480 0.680 0.840 
Female (dummy) 621 0.219 0.414 0 0 1 
ΔQ 547 0.004 0.459 -0.801 -0.035 1.098 
Tobin’s Q 589 3.155 2.879 0.606 2.168 11.694 
Tenure (years)  621 3.994 3.960 0 2.902 21.999 
Total compensation (adj.) 591 0.289 0.962 -0.652 0 1.886 
Non-executives (%) 621 54.9 15.9 0.00 54.5 92.9 
Market capitalization (in bn) 589 3.257 5.559 0.062 0.897 22.763 
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Table 2. Overall Facial Appearance and Voting Dissent 
 
The table shows the effect of our facial appearance variable that is measured in four different ways: score 
based on (1) mean rating, adjusted for rater biases, (2) mean rating, but not adjusted (raw data), (3) 
median rating, adjusted for rater biases, and (4) median rating, not adjusted (raw data) of dissent in 
corporate director elections. The respective calculation methods are described in section 2 and in 
Appendix B. The dependent variable is the logarithm of voting dissent (the sum of the non-positive votes 
over the positive votes, both in percentages). The table shows the coefficients (standard error), as well 
as the significance of the results at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The data are from Capital IQ, Datastream, Manifest, and from our own experiment. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Appearance (Mean, Scaled) 
-0.127** 
(0.052) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appearance (Mean, Raw) 
 
 
-0.120*** 
(0.046) 
 
 
 
 
Appearance (Median, Scaled) 
 
 
 
 
-0.105** 
(0.046) 
 
 
Appearance (Median, Raw) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.112*** 
(0.039) 
ΔQ 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Tenure 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Total compensation (adj.) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Non-executives (%) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
(Log) market capitalization 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Constant 
0.017 
(0.035) 
0.021 
(0.034) 
0.007 
(0.033) 
0.016 
(0.031) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.163 0.165 0.160 0.165 
N 414 414 414 414 
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Table 3. The Dimensions of Appearance and Voting Dissent 
 
The table shows the effect of the five appearance dimensions ((1) beauty, (2) competence, (3) 
trustworthiness, (4) likability, and (5) intelligence) on dissent in corporate director elections. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of voting dissent. The table shows the coefficients (standard errors), 
as well as the significance of the results at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, denoted with *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The data are from Capital IQ, Datastream, Manifest, and from our own experiment. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Appearance - beauty 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appearance - competence 
 
 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appearance - trustworthiness 
 
 
 
 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
 
 
 
 
Appearance - likability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
 
 
Appearance - intelligence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
ΔQ 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Tenure 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Total compensation (adj.) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Non-executives (%) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.031 
(0.025) 
0.038 
(0.024) 
(Log) market capitalization 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Constant 
-0.033 
(0.031) 
-0.052* 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.030) 
-0.016 
(0.031) 
-0.010 
(0.027) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.151 0.155 0.156 0.162 0.156 
N 414 414 414 414 414 
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Table 4. Gender, Director Type, (Re-)Elections, and Institutional Ownership 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of voting dissent on which the impact of gender is estimated in 
column (1). The table shows subsample analyses on the impact of appearance on executive versus non-
executive directors (columns (2) and (3)), on first elections versus re-elections (columns (4) and (5)) and 
on institutional ownership (columns (7) and (8)). The table shows the coefficients (standard errors), as 
well as the significance of the results at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
The data are from Capital IQ, Datastream, Manifest, and from our own experiment.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Focus on 
Female 
Executives 
only 
Non-
executives 
only 
First 
elections 
only 
Re-
elections 
only 
One re-
election per 
individual 
& company 
Low 
institutional 
ownership 
High 
institutional 
ownership 
Appearance 
-0.138** 
(0.066) 
-0.134** 
(0.056) 
-0.194 
(0.164) 
0.030 
(0.084) 
-0.168*** 
(0.061) 
-0.148* 
(0.085) 
-0.179* 
(0.101) 
-0.057 
(0.049) 
Appearance * Female 
0.145* 
(0.089) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Female 
-0.095* 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ΔQ 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
Tenure 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Total compensation (adj.) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Non-executives (%) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.025 
(0.035) 
0.023 
(0.037) 
0.052 
(0.057) 
0.025 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
0.029 
(0.040) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
(Log) market capitalization 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005** 
(0.003) 
Constant 
0.023 
(0.040) 
0.002 
(0.035) 
0.068 
(0.141) 
-0.174** 
(0.085) 
0.038 
(0.038) 
-0.007 
(0.069) 
-0.026 
(0.050) 
-0.032 
(0.049) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.167 0.192 0.192 0.273 0.168 0.272 0.251 0.193 
N  414 304 110 107 307 138 173 242 
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Table 5. Education, Alternative Measures, Non-linearity, and Random-effects Model 
 
The table shows the coefficients (standard errors), as well as the significance of the results at the 10%, 
5%, or 1% level, denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively. The data are from Boardex, Capital IQ, 
Datastream, Manifest, and from our own experiment.  
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Education 
Alternative 
dissent 
measure 
Std E cluster 
company & 
individual 
Random-
effects 
Appearance 
-0.123** 
(0.052) 
-0.109** 
(0.046) 
-0.127* 
(0.065) 
-0.127** 
(0.050) 
Education 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ΔQ 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
Tenure 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
Total compensation (adj.) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Non-executives (%) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
0.034 
(0.028) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
(Log) market capitalization 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Constant 
-0.015 
(0.031) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.165 0.171 0.163 0.165 
N  414 414 414 414 
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Appendix A. Amazon Mechanical Turk Experiment 
 
We conduct our appearance experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The raters are asked the list of 
questions presented below. Raters judge appearance based on a director’s photo extracted from the annual 
report. Responses are recorded on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). 
 
Appearance 
dimension 
Question 
Beauty 
What is your evaluation of the physical appearance or attractiveness  
of this person?  
Competence 
What is your evaluation of the competence of this person?  
(Competence: the ability to do something successfully or efficiently) 
Trustworthiness 
What is your evaluation of the trustworthiness of this person?  
(Trustworthiness: the ability to be relied on as honest or truthful) 
Likability 
What is your evaluation of the likability of this person?  
(Likability: being pleasant, friendly and easy to like) 
Intelligence 
What is your evaluation of the intelligence of this person?  
(Intelligence: the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills) 
 
 
Figure 1 Exemplary Screenshot from Raters’ Evaluations Conducted on 
Mechanical Turk.  
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Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition Source 
Voting   
Dissent 
The percentage of non-positive (against and abstained) 
votes, divided by the percentage of approval votes. 
Manifest 
Appearance measures   
Appearance (Mean, Scaled) 
The sum of the mean values of the five appearance-
dimensions (beauty, competence, trustworthiness, 
likability, and intelligence), each of which has been 
scaled by rater average rating. This sum is then divided 
by 25 (the maximum cumulative rating). 
Experiment 
(Mechanical Turk) 
Appearance (Mean, Raw) 
The sum of the mean values of the five appearance-
dimensions, each of which has not been scaled by rater 
average rating. This sum is then divided by 25 (the 
maximum cumulative rating) 
Experiment 
(Mechanical Turk) 
Appearance (Median, Scaled) 
The sum of the median values of the five appearance-
dimensions, each of which has been scaled by rater 
average rating. This sum is then divided by 25 (the 
maximum cumulative rating). 
Experiment 
(Mechanical Turk) 
Appearance (Median, Raw) 
The sum of the median values of the five appearance-
dimensions, each of which has not been scaled by rater 
average rating. This sum is then divided by 25 (the 
maximum cumulative rating). 
Experiment 
(Mechanical Turk) 
Appearance – Beauty 
The mean rating of the dimension Beauty, scaled by 
rater average rating. 
Mechanical Turk 
Appearance – Competence 
The mean rating of the dimension Competence, scaled 
by rater average rating. 
Mechanical Turk 
Appearance – Trustworthiness 
The mean rating of the dimension Trustworthiness, 
scaled by rater average rating. 
Mechanical Turk 
Appearance – Likability 
The mean rating of the dimension Likability, scaled by 
rater average rating. 
Mechanical Turk 
Appearance – Intelligence 
The mean rating of the dimension Intelligence, scaled 
by rater average rating. 
Mechanical Turk 
Performance   
ΔQ 
Change in Tobin’s Q relative to the average of the 
previous three years.  
Datastream 
Director traits   
Tenure 
The number of years a director serves in his current 
(board) position. 
CapitalIQ, Manifest 
Total compensation (adj.) 
An executive (non-executive) director’s annual total 
compensation minus the (median) total compensation of 
other executive (non-executive) directors of the same 
industry and year, standardized by the latter.  
CapitalIQ, Manifest 
Female 
A binary variable that equals 1 in case of a female 
director and 0 for a male director. 
CapitalIQ, Manifest 
Education 
A categorical variable (0-3) with a higher value for 
higher level of education:  1 if director has a 
professional or university-level BA/BSc degree, 2 for a 
MA/MSc degree, and 3 for a PhD. A director without a 
formal university degree is assigned a value of 0. 
CapitalIQ, Manifest 
Firm characteristics   
Non-executives (%) 
The percentage of non-executive directors serving on 
the board (the denominator is the total number of 
directors on the board).  
CapitalIQ, Manifest 
Market capitalization 
The market value of equity; the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied with the share price. 
CapitalIQ, Manifest 
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Appendix C. Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Appearance (Mean, Scaled) 1.000           
2 Appearance – Beauty 0.570 1.000          
3 Appearance – Competence 0.679 0.293 1.000         
4 Appearance – Trustworthiness 0.731 0.162 0.333 1.000        
5 Appearance – Likability 0.735 0.142 0.331 0.585 1.000       
6 Appearance – Intelligence 0.515 0.256 0.399 0.258 0.057 1.000      
7 ΔQ -0.038 0.028 -0.029 -0.076 -0.054 0.019 1.000     
8 Tenure 0.015 -0.038 0.087 -0.047 -0.002 0.083 -0.028 1.000    
9 Total compensation (adj.) 0.060 0.091 0.168 -0.015 -0.103 0.151 0.025 -0.038 1.000   
10 Non-executives (%) -0.019 -0.018 0.059 0.009 -0.126 0.099 0.068 -0.062 0.277 1.000  
11 (Log) market capitalization 0.014 0.034 0.128 -0.031 -0.101 0.095 0.013 -0.094 0.487 0.308 1.000 
 
 
 
